Overview of medical errors and adverse events. by Garrouste-Orgeas, Maïté et al.
Overview of medical errors and adverse events.
Ma¨ıte´ Garrouste-Orgeas, Franc¸ois Philippart, Ce´dric Bruel, Adeline Max,
Nicolas Lau, Benoˆıt Misset
To cite this version:
Ma¨ıte´ Garrouste-Orgeas, Franc¸ois Philippart, Ce´dric Bruel, Adeline Max, Nicolas Lau, et al..
Overview of medical errors and adverse events.. Annals of Intensive Care, BioMed Central,
2012, 2 (1), pp.2. <10.1186/2110-5820-2-2>. <inserm-00681935>
HAL Id: inserm-00681935
http://www.hal.inserm.fr/inserm-00681935
Submitted on 22 Mar 2012
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
REVIEW Open Access
Overview of medical errors and adverse events
Maité Garrouste-Orgeas1,2*, François Philippart1,3,4, Cédric Bruel1, Adeline Max1, Nicolas Lau1 and B Misset1,3
Abstract
Safety is a global concept that encompasses efficiency, security of care, reactivity of caregivers, and satisfaction of
patients and relatives. Patient safety has emerged as a major target for healthcare improvement. Quality assurance
is a complex task, and patients in the intensive care unit (ICU) are more likely than other hospitalized patients to
experience medical errors, due to the complexity of their conditions, need for urgent interventions, and
considerable workload fluctuation. Medication errors are the most common medical errors and can induce adverse
events. Two approaches are available for evaluating and improving quality-of-care: the room-for-improvement
model, in which problems are identified, plans are made to resolve them, and the results of the plans are
measured; and the monitoring model, in which quality indicators are defined as relevant to potential problems and
then monitored periodically. Indicators that reflect structures, processes, or outcomes have been developed by
medical societies. Surveillance of these indicators is organized at the hospital or national level. Using a combination
of methods improves the results. Errors are caused by combinations of human factors and system factors, and
information must be obtained on how people make errors in the ICU environment. Preventive strategies are more
likely to be effective if they rely on a system-based approach, in which organizational flaws are remedied, rather
than a human-based approach of encouraging people not to make errors. The development of a safety culture in
the ICU is crucial to effective prevention and should occur before the evaluation of safety programs, which are
more likely to be effective when they involve bundles of measures.
Introduction
During the past decade, healthcare quality and patient
safety have emerged as major targets for improvement.
Widely publicized reports from the United States, such
as Crossing the Quality Chasm [1] and To Err is Human
[2], showed that medical errors were common and
adversely affected patient outcomes. These publications
made the general public acutely aware of the inadequa-
cies in the health care available to them. They also
prompted healthcare providers, governments, and medi-
cal societies throughout the world to develop tools for
measuring healthcare quality in all the fields of medi-
cine. Institutions promoting error reporting were set up
in Australia [3] and the United States [4] in 2000, in the
United Kingdom in 2003 [5], and in France in 2006 [6].
The concept of quality has evolved from a process
grounded in the physician-patient relationship to
broader approaches involving the healthcare community,
concept of efficiency, and ethical access to care. When
discussing quality of care, it should be borne in mind
that safety is a global concept encompassing efficiency,
security of care, reactivity of caregivers, and satisfaction
of patients and relatives. Starting in the 19th century,
several landmark events laid the foundation for the
development of quality of care. During the Crimean war
in the 1850s, Florence Nightingale studied mortality
rates in military hospitals. In 1912, Ernest Codman
developed a method to measure the outcomes of surgi-
cal interventions. In 1918, the American College of Sur-
gery defined the minimum standard that hospitals
needed to fulfil to obtain accreditation. In 1950, the
medical audit method was developed by P. Lembcke in
the United States and 1 year later the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) was created to
accredit those hospitals that applied standard quality
measures. In 1970, J. Williamson introduced a new
method for assessing what is achievable but not
achieved by the standard of care to what is actually
done, via patient chart review and patient question-
naires. In 1992, Avedis Donabedian applied the indus-
trial model of structure, process, and outcome measures
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to the healthcare process. Finally, H. Palmer defined the
different dimensions of quality.
Quality assurance is a complex task, and patients in
the intensive care unit (ICU) are more likely than other
hospitalized patients to experience medical errors, due
to the complexity of their conditions, need for urgent
interventions, and considerable workload fluctuation
[7-15]. Thus, the risk of medical errors associated with
ICU admission deserves continuous attention. Safety
must be defined and measurement tools devised. The
indicators for routine monitoring must be clearly identi-
fied. The impact of medical errors and other adverse
events on patients and relatives must be investigated.
Prevention strategies must be developed and evaluated.
The keys to developing a culture of patient safety in the
ICU must be found. In this article, we review these
points.
Defining safety
In To Err is Human [2], safety is defined as freedom
from accidental injury and error as failure of a planned
action to be completed as intended (i.e., error of execu-
tion) or use of a wrong plan to achieve a goal (i.e., error
of planning). Two types of execution errors exist: errors
of commission (unintentionally doing the wrong thing)
and errors of omission (unintentionally not doing the
right thing). Errors can occur at any step of patient
management, including diagnosis, treatment, and
prevention.
An error may or may not cause an adverse event.
Adverse events are injuries that result from a medical
intervention and are responsible for harm to the patient
(death, life-threatening illness, disability at the time of
discharge, prolongation of the hospital stay, etc.) [2]. A
near-miss is an adverse event that either resolves spon-
taneously or is neutralized by voluntary action before
the consequences have time to develop. Adverse events
may be due to medical errors, in which case they are
preventable, or to factors that are not preventable.
Measuring safety
There are two basic approaches to the evaluation and
improvement of quality of care. In the room-for-
improvement model, problems are identified, plans are
then devised to correct the problems, and the effective-
ness of the plans is assessed. This approach is known as
the Plan-Do-Act Cycle (PDAC) of the Institute for
Healthcare Improvement. The second way to measure
safety is to use a monitoring system that detects pro-
blems and evaluates it periodically using quality indica-
tors. These two approaches are complementary and
often are used concomitantly. Thus, the monitoring
model can be viewed as a way to seek opportunities for
improvement by initiating a PDAC.
Safety measurement requires a self-assessment system
for quantifying what we do and how we do it to help us
to identify targets for improvement. A surveillance sys-
tem needs multiple identification methods to detect
medical errors and adverse events. These methods are
implemented at the national or local level. National gov-
ernments or agencies have developed reporting systems.
At the hospital level, public and private agencies in
North America have developed patient safety and
improvement programs since 2005, as well as private
databases to facilitate adverse-event reporting. In Eur-
ope, a safety program called The European Network for
Patient Safety (EUNetPAS) was launched in 2008 to
develop a culture of patient safety, provide a framework
for education and training in patient safety, develop a
core European curriculum on patient safety, implement
reporting and learning systems, and implement methods
to ensure medication safety. At the hospital level, differ-
ent reporting systems are available to healthcare
workers.
• The medical review. Reviews that do not target
selected indicators are time-consuming and depend on
the information available in the charts. Reviews can
focus on selected indicators that can be assessed using
the administrative data, discharge summaries, or mortal-
ity/morbidity review data. Medical reviews may be con-
ducted manually or electronically using text words or
text mining. Factors that may limit the use of the medi-
cal review method include absence of electronic medical
records, paucity of resources for performing the reviews,
variability in the terms used to label adverse events, and
spelling mistakes. Failure to standardize the terminology
may increase the difficulty of the search and the risk of
false-positive results. Moreover, the analysis of docu-
mented adverse events requires considerable skill in
interpreting the data. A meta-analysis comparing the
rate of detection of pharmacists vs. nonpharmacists
revealed a high level of adverse-event detection by phar-
macists [16].
• Voluntary reporting is the method most often used
to detect medical errors and adverse events. Limitations
include underreporting due to time constraints, lack of
adequate reporting systems, fear of litigation, a reluc-
tance to report one’s own errors, uncertainty of the clin-
ical importance of the events, and the lack of changes
after reporting. However, this reporting method is the
most useful for inducing behavioral changes, demon-
strating the benefits of adverse-event reporting, and
allowing us to learn from our errors. The presence of a
multidisciplinary safety team might facilitate voluntary
reporting.
• Medical errors and adverse events also can be
detected by direct observation at the bedside [17,18].
This method is useful for detecting errors by omission.
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For example, medication errors can occur at any stage
of the medication process (prescription, delivery, dispen-
sing, administration, and monitoring), Medication error
rates varied in the studies according to the definitions
used, the medication process being evaluated, and the
method of reporting. A pharmacist at the bedside can
collect errors by omissions not detected by voluntary
reporting. The medication error rate varied from 7.45/
1,000 patient-days with voluntary reporting to 560/1,000
patient-days with daily routine observation of prescrip-
tions [10,12]. Similarly, the presence of a trained clinical
research assistant who collected medical errors
increased the rate from 2.2/1,000 to 597/1,000 patient-
days in the IATROREF studies [14,19].
• The past several years have seen growing interest in
learning from patients’ experiences of care safety in all
countries [20], with an older tradition in the United
States and the United Kingdom via the CAHPS (Consu-
mer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems)
and National Health Service (NHS), respectively. In
2007, the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development) established the patient’s experi-
ence as a key priority. In the ICU, many patients are too
ill to report on their own experience, but information
can be obtained from families instead.
Combining these methods to ensure robust reporting
of medical errors and adverse events is essential to
obtain a global picture of care delivery in the ICU. The
above-described surveillance systems require the use of
valid indicators. Ideally, each indicator is expressed as a
rate with a numerator (number of events, which can be
defined easily and accurately) and a denominator
(domain of care or population at risk). The surveillance
system should include standardized data-collections
forms, which should be used by trained staff. Data qual-
ity must be checked regularly (via audits and checks of
missing data). Event rates may be difficult to determine
when the definitions differ across institutions or medical
societies or are not accepted by all leaders and when the
at-risk population cannot be accurately determined.
According to Avedis Donabedian, three categories of
indicators can be used: structure indicators (what we
want vs. what we have), process indicators (what we do
vs. what we should do), and outcome indicators (what
we achieved vs. what we should have achieved). Several
societies have published lists of indicators, and Table 1
summarizes the main indicators used in each category.
Since 2004, the Outcomerea organization has been
working on quality indicators for the ICU. A list was
built after searching the electronic MEDLINE database
using various combinations of the words “adverse
event,” “iatrogenic,” “intensive care unit,” “medical
error,” and “epidemiology.” This list contained 180
reported adverse events. In July 2004, we sent the list of
180 events to 30 experts working in 5 ICU fields (cardi-
ovascular disease, neurology, nephrology, pulmonology,
and gastroenterology), who added 415 events, for a total
of 575 events. Then, 30 other experts including intensi-
vists and ICU nurses participated in a Delphi process to
select indicators exhibiting the following characteristics:
precise and simple definition of the event and high inci-
dence of the event, impact on morbidity or mortality,
and nonpunitive disclosure. A list of 14 events was cho-
sen as sufficiently long to provide useful data yet not so
long as to hinder the feasibility of a multicenter study
designed to assess their incidence. To reduce bias in
data collection, the steering committee developed
detailed definitions for all events, and the definitions
were then reviewed and validated by the experts. These
indicators are listed in Table 1.
The choice of safety indicators depends on several fac-
tors, such as previous quality indicators monitored in
the unit, monitoring methods, availability of time to
monitor additional indicators and to provide feedback to
the team, and whether monitoring of processes is insti-
tuted before monitoring of outcomes related to those
processes. Improving safety requires time, organization,
and resources. The goal is to achieve the best possible
quality given our resources. Both process and outcome
indicators should probably be selected. The process
indicators should be related to robust outcomes and the
outcomes should be at least partly preventable. Among
nosocomial infections, catheter-related infections exhibit
these characteristics [21,22]. Other suitable outcomes
are accidental extubation [14,23], pressure sores [24,25],
falls, rate of readmission within 48 hours [26-28], family
satisfaction [29], and morbidity-mortality conferences
[30].
Incidence, risk factors, and impact on patient outcomes
of medical errors and adverse events
Comparing the rates of medical errors and adverse
events across studies can be challenging due to differ-
ences in definitions and to the absence of clear defini-
tions of harms. Even when clear definitions of harms are
established before the study, harm rates may be under-
estimated [14]. Two types of medical errors and adverse
events are reported: those related to medications, and
those related to procedures or the ICU environment.
Administering the right drug to the right patient at the
right frequency in the right dose and via the right route
represents a challenge for the nursing staff. The Critical
Care Safety Study reported an overall rate of 80.5 medi-
cation errors associated with harm/1,000 patient-days in
medical and coronary-care patients [11]. In the recent
worldwide SEE2 study, the rate of parenteral medication
errors was 745/1,000 patient-days [10]. With medica-
tions given by continuous infusion, the rate was 105/
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Table 1 List of safety indicators
Process indicators
Mechanical ventilation
Semi-recumbent position during mechanical ventilation [72,73]
Overinflation of the endotracheal balloon [14]
Sedation
Appropriate sedation [72,74]
Screening for ventilator weaning readiness [73]
Sedation interruption [73]
Sedation monitoring [73]
Medication
Medication administered to wrong patient [14]
Error administering anticoagulant medication [14]
Error prescribing anticoagulant medication [14]
Error administering vasoactive drugs [14]
Error administering insulin [14]
Death or serious disability associated with hypoglycaemia [75]
IV lines
Screening for readiness for removal of central venous catheter [72]
Management
Appropriate use of prophylaxis against gastrointestinal haemorrhage in patients receiving mechanical ventilation [72,73]
Appropriate use of thromboembolism prophylaxis [72,73]
Appropriate use of early enteral nutrition [72]
Early management of severe sepsis, septic shock [72]
Surgical intervention in traumatic brain injury with subdural and/or epidural brain trauma [72]
Monitoring of intracranial pressure in severe traumatic brain injury with abnormal CT findings [72]
Delay in surgical treatment [14]
Change of route for quinolones IV/PO [72]
Screening for MRSA on admission [76]
Pain management in un sedated patients [72]
Events during ICU transport [73]
Complications
Pneumonia associated with mechanical ventilation [72]
Accidental extubation [23,73,76]
Accidental removal of a central venous catheter
Catheter-related bloodstream infections [76]
Pneumothorax related to insertion of a central venous catheter [40,76]
Death or serious disability associated with intravascular air embolism [75]
Fall [14]
Death or serious disability associated with a haemolytic reaction due to the administration of ABO-incompatible blood or blood product [75]
Percentage of resistant organisms [74]
Pressure sores [73]
Outcome indicators
ICU mortality rate [74]
Hospital mortality rate [73]
Percentage of ICU patients with ICU stays longer than 7 days [74]
Mean ICU length of stay [74]
Mean days on mechanical ventilation [74]
Rate of re-admissions < 72 hours [73]
Family satisfaction [73]
Structural indicators
Institutional variables
Process for ensuring staff competencies
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1,000 patient-days [31]. When direct observation at the
bedside was used for detection, one medical error was
documented for every five doses of medication adminis-
tered, and among medical errors 23% were errors by
omission [17]. Stress ulcer protectors and preventive
anticoagulants were among the most often omitted drugs
[32]. Vasopressors and catecholamines, insulin, coagula-
tion-altering drugs, antimicrobials, and sedatives were
the medications most often involved in medical errors
[10]. Insulin and coagulation-altering drugs are asso-
ciated with numerous errors related to the complexity of
dosing and/or monitoring. In recent years, evidence sup-
porting insulin therapy and tight glucose control has led
to an increase in the use of insulin in ICU patients
[33-35]. Clinical trials have demonstrated that this strat-
egy increases the incidence of hypoglycemic episodes
[36-38]. The IATROREF study found a rate of 757 medi-
cal errors/1,000 patient-days and 126 adverse events/
1,000 patient-days for insulin administration [14].
Numerous other medical errors and adverse events
related to procedures and equipment have been investi-
gated in the ICU [9]. Mechanical ventilation was asso-
ciated with at least one incident in 95/137 patients
(0.004 per patient and per day of mechanical ventilation)
[39]. Pneumothorax, one of the main complications of
both barotrauma and catheter insertion, was reported in
1.5% of patients on day 5 after ventilation initiation [40]
and was associated with a threefold increase in the risk
of death [15]. All tubes, lines, and drains used in the
care of ICU patients can be removed accidentally [41],
with an incidence of 22 removals/1,000 patient-days in a
French study [42] and 14.5/100 patient-days in a multi-
center European study [9]. Maintaining homeostasis is
of great importance, and acquired electrolyte disorders
can occur as a manifestation of poor quality of care dur-
ing the ICU stay and can result in increased morbidity
or mortality rates [43,44].
Risk factors for medical errors and adverse events
have been extensively studied. They pertain either to the
ICU or to the patient. The highly sophisticated treat-
ments, technologies, and diagnostic tools used in the
ICU are associated with a high risk of medical errors
and adverse events [45]. In the IATROREF study, risk
factors for medical errors consisted of mechanical venti-
lation, insulin use, central catheterization, and unsched-
uled surgery [14]. A study in a French medical ICU
identified age older than 65 years and presence of more
than two organ failures as independent risk factors for
adverse events [13]. A relationship between severity of
illness and adverse events was found in a large multi-
center European study in which any organ failure, high
or excessive workload, and risk factor exposure time
independently predicted adverse events [9].
The impact of medical errors or adverse events is diffi-
cult to assess due to differences in case-mix, confounding
factors for mortality, and occurrence of multiple events
in the same patients [15]. Sophisticated analysis methods
must therefore be used to evaluate relations between
medical errors or adverse events and patient outcomes.
The IATROREF study identified 1,192 medical errors in
1,369 patients; of these, 183 (15.4%) in 128 (9.3%)
patients were adverse events that were followed by one
or more clinical consequences (n = 163) or required one
or more procedures or treatments (n = 58). After adjust-
ment for risk-factor exposure time, medical errors, even
when multiple, had no impact on mortality. In contrast,
having more than two adverse events was associated with
a threefold increase in the risk of death [14].
Preventing medical errors and adverse events
The occurrence of errors is caused by a combination of
human factors and system factors [46]. People often
make errors, and rates of human error have ranged
from 30% to 80% [13,47,48]. What humans do results
Table 1 List of safety indicators (Continued)
Transitional period to integrate new healthcare workers
Clear task identification
Absenteeism, magnitude of personnel turn-over
Adverse-event reporting system
Task variables
Availability of protocols
Policy to prevent medication errors
Policy to register outcomes
Team variables
Adequacy of staffing
Nurse-to-patient ratio
Availability of an intensive care practitioner 24 h a day
Pharmacist present during ICU rounds [77])
Communication or conflicts among team members [78]
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from interactions between people and the system in
which they work. Interventions designed to increase
concentration and diligence among healthcare workers
are not effective: human errors are unavoidable. Instead,
the work conditions should be designed in a way that
minimises errors: as stated by Reason, “We cannot
change the human condition, but we can change condi-
tions under which humans work” [46]. For example,
when two drugs that are very similar in their presenta-
tion are stored in the same area, the human-based
approach would consist of educating the healthcare
workers to pay attention to this similarity to avoid
errors. The system-based approach would lead to sto-
rage of the two drugs in different places. In the system
approach, the key question is not identification of the
person responsible for the error but determination of
how the error occurred. The mechanism underlying the
error is thus identified, without placing blame on the
healthcare workers. Then, the organizational flaw can be
corrected with the goal of preventing further occur-
rences of the error.
Since the 1980s, a large amount of work has examined
the role for a safety culture in preventing medical errors.
Safety culture or safety climate (the two terms are some-
times used interchangeably but “safety culture” is gener-
ally seen as a more embracing term than “safety
climate”) is a concept originally used to describe the
safety management inadequacies resulting in major dis-
asters. Thus, the term was first used after the Chernobyl
nuclear accident. Now, the concept has evolved to apply
to errors at the individual level. The most widely used
definition of the safety culture is that developed by the
U.K. Health and Safety Commission: the safety culture
is “the product of individual and group values, attitudes,
perceptions, competencies and patterns of behavior that
determine the commitment to, and the style and profi-
ciency of, an organization’s health and safety manage-
ment” [49]. The description of the safety culture
concept has been largely empirical. For example, Sexton
et al. [50] suggested six dimensions: teamwork climate,
job satisfaction, perceptions of management, safety cli-
mate, working conditions, and stress recognition;
whereas others described a larger number of organiza-
tional dimensions [39-41]. ICU and hospital organiza-
tion is a key point in the safety culture concept. The
organizational dimension includes human and technolo-
gical aspects. Concern over the high rate of medication
errors has prompted increased interest in using technol-
ogy to improve safety [51]. New technologies implemen-
ted in recent years include electronic health records,
clinical decision support with or without a computerized
provider order entry system, bar-code medication
administration, and smart infusion pumps [51].
Although these technologies decreased the number of
errors, there is little evidence for a concomitant decrease
in harms [52-55]. Furthermore, these new technologies
have created new errors and harms [56-58]. Before con-
sidering their implementation, we must define the clini-
cal settings in which they may be effective, and we must
address the specific difficulties raised by their use in the
ICU. Many errors are related to less-than-ideal human
organization. For instance, burnout syndrome occurs in
almost half the physicians and one-third of the nurses
in French ICUs [59,60]. Burnout syndrome can
adversely affect healthcare worker performance, thereby
contributing to medical errors and adverse events. Fac-
tors that increase the rate of burnout syndrome include
high patient volume, high levels of noise and light, long
shifts [61], changes in shift hours, and the occurrence of
conflicts [62]. In a study of intern work hours, the tradi-
tional intern work schedule involving work shifts longer
than 24 hours and a mean of 77 to 81 work hours per
week was compared to a schedule designed to decrease
sleep deprivation (15-hour shifts at the most, with 60-63
work hours per week) [61]. The traditional schedule was
associated with a 22% higher rate of serious errors
(193.2 vs. 158.4/1,000 patient-days, p < 0.001), a 20.8%
higher rate of serious medication errors (99.7 vs. 85.5/
1,000 patient-days, p = 0.03), and a 5.6-fold increase in
serious diagnostic errors (18.6 vs. 3.3/1,000 patient-days,
p < 0.001). It would be useful to test interventions
designed to improve well-being at work and to assess
their impact on the rates of medical errors and adverse
events [63].
A number of targets for improvement have been iden-
tified [64,65]. The Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality identified five measures that have effects of vary-
ing magnitude on physician behavior (academic detail-
ing, audit and feedback, reminder systems, interventions
by local opinion leaders, and printed material) [65].
Multifaceted programs or bundles are more effective to
improve safety than are isolated measures and have
been used in several studies [19,66,67]. In the
IATROREF study, we used educational slide shows,
printed educational material, and feedback meetings;
and we focused on errors administering insulin, errors
administering and prescribing anticoagulants, and acci-
dental removal of endotracheal tubes and central venous
catheters [19]. Our program was effective in preventing
insulin errors and accidental tube/catheter removal.
However, significant Hawthorne effects were documen-
ted [19]. In a multicenter, cluster-randomized study, a
multifaceted program, including feedback meetings,
expert-led educational sessions, and dissemination of
algorithms, significantly improved process indicators,
such as the semirecumbent position for nosocomial
pneumonia prevention and measures to prevent central
catheter infections [67]. Similarly, a bundle strategy
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decreased the rate of nosocomial pneumonia [68]. In
2003, the Michigan Keystone ICU Patient Safety Pro-
gram based on a John Hopkins University model was
launched to eliminate catheter-related infections and
ventilator-associated pneumonia. The model is based on
the four Es: Engage, Educate, Execute, and Evaluate [69].
The Michigan hospitals reported improvements in
adherence to guidelines for ventilator-associated pneu-
monia prevention and decreases in the rates of catheter-
related infections [22,70,71].
Conclusions
Medical errors and adverse events are very common in
ICUs, and among them the most prevalent involve med-
ications. Identification of these errors requires efficient
reporting systems, usually based on a combination of
methods. Many valid indicators have been developed.
The prevention of medical errors and adverse events
requires combined changes in ICU organization and
healthcare worker behaviors. Sharing values and beha-
viors within the team with the support of hospital lea-
ders is probably the most powerful means of building a
safety climate for the patients. Multilayered programs
associated with a profound change in the approach to
patient safety offer the greatest likelihood of success.
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